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CaseNo.20110428-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jamis M. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
Appellant's Brief 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson") appeals the finding of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court finding him in violation of the terms of his probation and subsequent order 
revoking probation, and imposing the original sentence in this matter. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue #1: Whether Johnson's probationary period had lapsed prior to the State filing 
its Order to Show Cause in October 2010, thereby depriving the district court of 
jurisdiction to receive evidence of an alleged probation violation and/or impose a 
sanction for a perceived violation. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: Although Defendant was placed on probation after the 
conclusion of a criminal jury trial, probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. 
Such proceedings are entirely independent of any related criminal proceeding. State v. 
Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The issue presented above 
challenges whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear allegations of Johnson's 
violations of probation, and therefore challenges a conclusion of law. See State v. Reber, 
111 P.3d 406 (Utah 2007); see also Salt Lake City v. Weiner, 219 P.3d 72 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009). A trial court's conclusion of law in civil proceedings, as well as in criminal cases, 
is reviewed for correctness. See Black v. Allstate Ins. Co. 100 P.3d 1163; see State v. 
Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106. 
Issue #2: Whether Johnson violated the term of his probation requiring that he report 
to Adult Probation and Parole even though Johnson, prior to failing to report as 
instructed, filed a Motion to Stay and Certificate of Probable Cause which specifically 
requested that his probation be converted from supervised probation to Court probation, 
and where Johnson's motions were granted.1 
Standard of Review: Although Defendant was placed on probation after the 
conclusion of a criminal jury trial, probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. 
Such proceedings are entirely independent of any related criminal proceeding. State v. 
Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The issues set forth by the 
Defendant/Appellant for determination by this Court challenge the trial court's 
1
 If Issue #1 is decided favorably for the Appellant, then Issue #2 is moot. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discretionary ruling that Defendant/Appellant violated a term of his probation. A trial 
court's discretionary ruling will be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be 
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O'Dell, 
855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the 
decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, at 938 (Utah 1993). 
Issue #3: Whether Johnson violated the term of his probation requiring that he 
commit no further law violations where Johnson was convicted of mail fraud in federal 
court, but where the convictions relate to conduct which pre-date Johnson's sentence and 
imposition of probationary terms in the state district court case. 
Standard of Review: Although Defendant was placed on probation after the 
conclusion of a criminal jury trial, probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. 
Such proceedings are entirely independent of any related criminal proceeding. State v. 
Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The issues set forth by the 
Defendant/Appellant for determination by this Court challenge the trial court's 
discretionary ruling that Defendant/Appellant violated a term of his probation. A trial 
court's discretionary ruling will be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be 
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O'Dell, 
855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the 
decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, at 938 (Utah 1993). 
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CASE STATEMENT 
District Court's Legal Conclusion That Johnson's Probation Was Tolled When the 
State Filed an Order to Show Cause, Thereby Extending Johnson's Probationary 
Term, Was In Error 
Johnson was convicted of Securities Fraud, a 2nd degree Felony, on or about 
March 7, 2007, at the conclusion of a trial by jury. Johnson was sentenced to serve three-
hundred and sixty-five (365) days in the Millard County Jail and was placed on 
supervised probation with the office of Adult Probation and Parole for thirty-six (36) 
months. The sentence was imposed on or about June 6, 2007. Accordingly, the thirty-six 
(36) month term of probation was set to expire on or about June 6, 2010. 
On August 31, 2007, an Order to Show Cause alleging a probation violation was 
filed and an evidentiary hearing, with both parties in attendance, was held on October 10, 
2007. At the conclusion of the October 10, 2007 hearing the Defendant's probation was 
revoked and reinstated for thirty-six (36) months. Effectively, Johnson's thirty-six (36) 
month period of probation began anew, and was then set to expire on or about October 
10,2010. 
On or about June 11, 2008, another Order to Show Cause alleging probation 
violations was filed and an evidentiary hearing was held on October 20, 2008. However, 
the October 20, 2008 hearing did not result in a finding or order that altered the 
expiration of Defendant's thirty-six (36) month term of probation. 
On or about March 31, 2009, yet another Order to Show Cause was filed alleging 
probation violations. This Order to Show Cause was based on a federal indictment of the 
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Defendant, and a hearing was scheduled for April 15, 2009. The April 15, 2009 hearing 
was not substantive in nature, and at its conclusion a status conference was scheduled for 
July 8, 2009. Again, the July 8, 2009 hearing was not dispositive, and review hearing 
was set for December 9, 2009. At the conclusion of the December 9, 2009 review 
hearing, another review hearing was set for March 31, 2010. 
Neither the April 15, 2009 hearing, nor the July 8, 2009 hearing, nor the December 
9, 2009 hearing, nor the March 31, 2010 hearing resulted in any order or finding from the 
District Court which altered the status or terms of Johnson's probation. Accordingly, 
Johnson's thirty-six (36) month period of probation remained set to expire on or about 
October 10, 2010. 
At some point prior to January 20, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a 
decision remanding the case back to the district court for matters involving restitution. 
However, nothing in the Utah Court of Appeals' decision altered or affected the 
expiration date of Johnson's probation. 
On or about June 23, 2010, yet another Order to Show Cause alleging probation 
violations was filed and at the conclusion of the corresponding August 30, 2010 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court found the Defendant in violation of his probation 
for failing to obtain verifiable full-time employment. The District Court further revoked 
and reinstated the Defendant's probation for thirty-six (36) months, which effectively 
changed the date that the Defendant's probation would have otherwise expired. 
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However, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on September 7, 2010, and the 
matter is currently under review with the Utah Court of Appeals. Further, Johnson filed 
a Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal. Johnson's motion was granted and the 
District Court's order specifically stayed the previous order of the District Court wherein 
Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated.3 
The State then filed a notice of probation violation and order to show cause on 
November 10, 2010, alleging that Johnson failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole 
as required by the terms of his probation. At the conclusion of the May 17, 2011 
evidentiary hearing the Court found Johnson in violation of probation. 
However, Johnson's probation had already expired on October 10, 2010. Johnson 
acknowledges that the district court's August 30, 2010 findings and sanction would 
change his probation expiration date to extend beyond November 10, 2010, but that 
finding and sanction have been stayed pending appeal. Therefore, the district court did 
not have jurisdiction to entertain allegations of violations of probation after October 10, 
2010, unless and until Johnson's appeal of the August 30, 2010 findings fails, and the 
stay is lifted. 
2
 Johnson v. State, Case No. 20100734-CA. As of the date of filing this Brief, it is 
believed that the Utah Court of Appeals has not yet issued its opinion in this matter. 
3
 For the reader's convenience, a copy of the November 3, 2010 Order, and the Certificate 
of Probable Cause are provided with this brief in Addendum A. 
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Even If it is Determined that Johnson's Probation Had Not Expired, Johnson 
Reasonably Relied on the Probable Cause Certificate Which Required Johnson to 
Report to the Court Not to Adult Probation and Parole 
On November 3, 2010, the district court issued an order staying August 30, 2010 
sanction wherein Johnson's probation was revoked and reinstated. The district court also 
issued a certificate of probable cause which ordered that, while the matter was on appeal, 
Johnson would report to the district court on a monthly basis. 
At the May 17, 2011 evidentiary hearing, the State argued that Johnson violated 
the term of his probation when he failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole as 
previously directed. Johnson responded, in kind, that he had reported to the Court on a 
monthly basis as provided for in the Certificate of Probable Cause. 
The district court disagreed with Johnson's assertion that he was required to report 
to the court and found that he failed to comply with the instructions of Adult Probation 
and Parole and was therefore in violation of the relevant term of his probation. 
Additionally, the Court found that even if Johnson understood that he was to 
report directly to the Court on a monthly basis, that Johnson had failed to comply. 
However, no evidence was offered that Johnson failed to report to the Court on a monthly 
basis. In fact, Johnson testified that he had in fact reported monthly. Yet, the district 
court made a sua sponte finding that Johnson had failed to report to the district court on a 
monthly basis. 
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Accordingly, this Court should find that Johnson was entitled to report to the 
district court, instead of with Adult Probation and Parole, as provided for in the 
Certificate of Probable Cause, and therefore find that there was no violation of probation. 
Alternatively, the issue should be remanded to the district court to take evidence as to 
whether Johnson reported to the Court on a monthly basis. 
Johnson Did Not Commit Any Federal Crimes While On Probation in the District 
Court Case; Johnson's Federal Criminal Convictions are the Result of Alleged 
Wrongdoing Prior to the Johnson's Sentence and Imposition of Probation in 
District Court 
Johnson was convicted of various federal crimes on March 18, 2011. At the May 
17, 2011 evidentiary hearing in district court the State argued that Johnson violated the 
term of his probation which required that he commit no further law violations, whether 
state, local or federal. The State presented the district court with evidence of Johnson's 
conviction and asked the Court to determine that Johnson violated the relevant term of his 
probation. 
However, Johnson was sentenced and placed on probation in the district court case 
on June 6, 2007. All federal charges that Johnson was convicted of relate to, and allege, 
conduct that took place prior to June 6, 2007, and thus prior to the time in which Johnson 
was on probation. 
True, there were initially federal charges that alleged illegal conduct on dates after 
Johnson was placed on probation. But, all allegations alleging illegal conduct after June 
6, 2007 were dismissed. In short, Johnson's federal convictions found him guilty of 
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committing illegal acts prior to June 6, 2007 and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a 
finding that Johnson violated terms of probation which were not imposed until after that 
date. 
The district court itself realized its error, and on June 17, 2011 issued an order 
correcting its error. However, the State filed a Motion to Vacate and Request to Remand 
the June 17, 2011 order because Johnson had already filed his notice of appeal, thus 
depriving the district court of jurisdiction to correct its error. 
As the district court was in error in finding that Johnson's federal convictions 
serve as a basis to violate his probation in district court, this Court should overturn the 
May 17,2011 finding. 
Alternatively, this Court should remand the issue to the district court, allowing the 
district court to enter its June 17, 2011 order wherein the district court acknowledged, and 
sought to correct, its error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER 
AS JOHNSON'S PROBATIONARY TERM EXPIRED ON OCTOBER 10, 2010, 
ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE STATE FILING ITS NOVEMBER 12, 2010 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ALLEGING PROBATION VIOLATIONS 
Generally, a "court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely 
statutory." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 at 791 (Utah 1990). Utah Code Annotated §77-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18-1(1 l)(b), states that, "The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court." 
Admittedly, numerous Orders to Show Cause have been filed, for various reasons, 
throughout the period of Johnson's probation. The alleged probation violation for this 
Court's consideration stems from the March 31, 2009 an Order to Show Cause based on 
allegations that the Defendant violated a term of his probation in that he was criminally 
indicted in federal court. 
Johnson anticipates that the State will argue that, as a result of the March 31, 2009 
issuance of an Order to Show Cause, Johnson's probationary period was tolled. 
Consequently, Johnson would be found to have been on probation, and required to 
comply with all the terms of his probation, on November 10, 2010, when the State filed 
its notice of probation violations and order to show cause. 
While it may initially appear that the State's position carries weight, this Court 
must consider the fact that the rder to show cause in question was more than two years 
old before an evidentiary hearing was ever held. More importantly, no order was ever 
entered by this Court that revoked, extended, or otherwise altered the Defendant's 
probationary period prior to the evidentiary hearing which was held on May 17, 2011. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1 (12)(a)(i) states that, 
"Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has 
violated the conditions of probation." 
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The Utah Supreme Court considered a case with facts and issues remarkably 
similar to those now present before this Court when it decided State v. Green, 757 P.2d 
462 (Utah 1988). Terry Green ("Green") was convicted of issuing bad checks and 
sentenced by the trial court on May 29, 1984. Green was placed on probation with one of 
the terms of probation being that he would not violate federal, state or local laws. 
Green's case was reviewed several times by the trial court and on February 18, 
1986, the office of Adult Probation and Parole reported that Green had been charged with 
two counts of sodomy on a child and one count of attempted rape of a child. Green was 
in fact convicted of all three offenses on June 26, 1986. 
Green appealed the new convictions and, as a result of the pending appeal, the 
probation violation matter was continued to permit the appeal to be decided. No order 
respecting the status of Green's probation was entered. However, the trial court later 
discovered that Green had not filed an appeal and therefore found that the new 
convictions resulted in a violation of his probation.4 
Green then appealed that finding, arguing that his probation had terminated prior 
to the finding of a probation violation. Green argued that unless the court acted to revoke 
or extend the probationary term, prior to the expiration of probation, that the trial court 
lost jurisdiction over the Defendant. 
4
 The trial court also ruled that Utah Code Annotated §77-18-10(a) was unconstitutional 
because it limited the sentencing power of judges. However, neither Green nor the State 
addressed that issue on appeal as both parties agreed that such a holding was 
unnecessarily broad. Though the Utah Supreme Court did address the issue of the 
statue's constitutionality, the issue is not addressed here as it is superfluous to the facts 
and arguments of this case. 
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In response to Green's argument, the State argued that probation is not 
automatically terminated once the probationary period expires, and therefore the court did 
not lose jurisdiction over Green. The State further argued for an interpretation of the 
probation statute that would allow a trial court to revoke probation after the expiration of 
the probationary period if the State alleged that a violation occurred during the 
probationary period. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order revoking probation 
and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order terminating custody. The 
Supreme Court held that: 
"The State's interpretation of the statute would create absurd results. Defendants 
would be left in a perpetual state of limbo; although their probation would appear 
to have been terminated, usually by entry of an order to that effect, defendants 
would actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision. This 
indefinite probationary term could theoretically be revoked many years after the 
original imposition and suspension of sentence. Decades could pass and then, 
based upon the discovery of a probation violation which had occurred during the 
statutory period, a court could revoke a term of probation thought to have been 
terminated long ago. This construction would obviate the certainty and regularity 
created by the statute and ignore the plain meaning of the word 'terminate.'" 
Id. at 464. 
Defendant recognizes that in Green the argument centered on a statutory provision 
different from the statue at the center of the case before this Court. Green relied upon a 
statute which provided that probation terminates, by operation of law, after eighteen (18) 
months if a defendant doesn't commit any probation violations. In fact note three (3) of 
the decision specifically states that, "Because the revocation proceedings in this case 
were not initiated until after the statutory probation term had expired, we need not reach 
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the issue of the retention of jurisdiction when proceedings have been initiated but not 
completed within the eighteen-month term." Id. 
The issue which the Supreme Court did not reach is precisely the issue the parties 
are asking this Court to now consider. To wit, whether the district court has jurisdiction 
to hear allegations of probation violations once the probationary term has expired, but 
where no existing order revokes, extends, or otherwise alters the expiration date of 
Defendant's probation, but where an Order to Show Cause was filed within the original 
probationary period. 
Here, Johnson is accused of having violated the term of his probation which 
required that he not violate any federal, state or local law. In support of the allegation the 
State offers evidence of a federal indictment. Like Green, the date upon which Johnson's 
term of probation would have, or did, expire has past. Yet, prior to that date there was no 
hearing to determine the merit of the State's November 10, 2010 provation violation 
allegations. More importantly, and also like Green, there was absolutely no order in 
place, at the time of the expiration of Johnson's probation that revokes, extends or 
otherwise effects the expiration of Defendant's probation (except of course for the 
August 30, 2010 order which is addressed in section II below). 
Accordingly, as Defendant's thirty-six (36) month probation period has expired, 
and because there is no final finding that Johnson violated his probation, nor is there any 
final order effecting the expiration of Defendant's probation, the Defendant's probation 
cannot be indefinitely tolled. To hold otherwise would be to hold that "defendants would 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision," id. at 464, a holding 
which the Supreme Court rejected. 
II. 
JOHNSON DID NOT VIOLATE PROBATION BY FAILING TO REPORT TO 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE BECAUSE HIS PROBATION HAD 
EFFECTIVELY BEEN CONVERTED TO COURT PROBATION 
Subsequent to the district court finding Johnson in violation of his probation on 
August 30, 2010,5 Johnson filed, in his pro se capacity, a Motion to Stay Sentence 
Pending Appeal and Certificate of Probable Cause. Ultimately, his motion and certificate 
were granted6. Further, the Certificate of Probable Cause clearly states that Johnson, 
during the time period in which his probation was stayed pending appeal, was required to 
report to the Court on a monthly basis. 
As the district court took evidence during the May 17, 2011 hearing, the State 
argued that Johnson violated the term of his probation that he report to Adult Probation 
and Parole when instructed to do so. In response, Johnson pointed out the requirement 
set forth, with regards to reporting, in the Certificate of Probable Cause only requires that 
he report to the Court. 
At the conclusion of arguments, the district court stated that Johnson's argument 
that he was only required to report to the court, and not to Adult Probation and Parole, 
5
 As stated previously, the district court's finding of a probation violation is currently 
under appellate review in Case No. 20100734-CA. 
6
 For the reader's convenience, a copy of the November 3, 2010 Order, and the Certificate 
of Probable Cause are provided with this brief in Addendum A. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was not persuasive. The Court stated that "I also don't believe that he was on court 
probation, but if he understood it that way, he didn't comply. He didn't comply with 
AP&P probation either." Transcript p. 70. 
In support of its finding, the court stated that "[Johnson] claims that he reported to 
the Court on a monthly basis. And I appreciate the argument, but it's not persuasive. I 
don't believe I ever met with Mr. Johnson. I don't think he's ever provided me any 
information regarding his housing, his employment, his income, his opportunities or his 
efforts to make restitution." Id. at 69-70. 
However, other than Johnson's testimony that he had in fact reported to the Court 
on a monthly basis, no evidence was presented as to Johnson's compliance with the 
requirement that he report to the Court on a monthly basis. The Court, sua sponte, simply 
declared that Johnson had not reported, or at least that the judge presiding over the matter 
was not aware of his reporting. 
Certainly, the district court, when placing a defendant on court probation can 
require that the probationer report to the court with any level of detail satisfactory to the 
court. However, the court previously made no request of Johnson to provide the court 
with information regarding his housing, his employment, his income, his opportunities or 
his efforts to make restitution. The Certificate of Probable Cause simply stated that 
Johnson was to report to the Court on a monthly basis. 
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Therefore, Johnson was in compliance with the order of the Court set forth in the 
Certificate of Probable Cause. Alternatively, this Court should remand this matter to the 
District Court in order for evidence to be taken as to whether Johnson did in fact report to 
the Court on a monthly basis as required by the Certificate of Probable Cause. 
III. 
JOHNSON DID NOT VIOLATE THE TERM OF HIS PROBATION THAT HE 
COMMIT NO FURTHER LAW VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THE FEDERAL 
CONVICTIONS FOR MAIL FRAUD RELATE TO CONDUCT WITH PRE-
DATES JOHNSON'S PLACEMENT ON PROBATION 
At the May 17, 2011 evidentiary hearing the State argued that Johnson violated the 
term of his probation that he commit no violations of law, whether state, local or federal. 
In support of its allegation, the State introduced evidence that Johnson was convicted in 
federal court of mail fraud. That conviction was dated March 18, 2011. 
However, as was argued to the district court during the evidentiary hearing, all 
federal convictions involving Johnson stem from conduct that took place, according to 
the federal indictment, prior to June 6, 2007 - the date upon which Johnson was placed 
on supervised probation. In fact, the only two allegations from the federal indictment, 
Counts 10 and 22, which allege conduct that took place while Johnson was on probation 
were dismissed by the office of the U.S. Attorney on March 18, 2011. 
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In fact the Court ultimately came to this conclusion as well. Though the Court 
found Johnson to have violated the above stated term of his probation, the Court reversed 
its own finding in an order dated June 17, 2011. 
The district court, subsequent to Johnson's pro se filing of a Motion to Extend Jail 
Term 30 days, reviewed its finding and ruling from the May 17, 2011 evidentiary 
hearing. The court came to the conclusion that it had made a clear and unambiguous 
determination that Defendant could not be found in violation of probation for actions he 
took prior to being placed on probation. The court recognized its error in finding Johnson 
in violation of his probation, based on allegations of committing federal crimes when the 
allegations in the federal indictment alleging conduct occurring during Johnson's 
probation, when those very allegations were dismissed. The Court's June 17, 2011, 
order, in paragraph 4, states that its "conclusion was made in error. Upon review it is 
clear that the dates of these offenses predate Defendant's sentencing in the present case." 
However, after the Court recognized and reversed its finding and order, the State 
filed a Motion to Vacate Order, arguing that because Johnson filed his Notice of Appeal 
before the Court corrected its error, therefore depriving the district court of jurisdiction to 
make any additional findings or orders while the matter was on appeal. To date, it does 
not appear as though the State's request for remand has been granted. Accordingly, 
Johnson believes it is either in the hands of this appellate court to correct the district 
7
 For the reader's convenience, a copy of the Jun 17, 2011 Order is provided with this 
brief in Addendum. 
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court's error, as the district court attempted to do itself, or to remand the issue to the 
district court and allow the district court's June 17, 2011 order to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the district court did not 
have jurisdiction over Johnson while his probation was stayed pending appeal. 
Alternatively, this Court should find that the district court's finding that Johnson violated 
the terms of his probation was arbitrary and capricious, as there was no reasonable basis 
to find that Johnson failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole when the Certificate of 
Probable Cause order Johnson to report to the Court; also, that there was no reasonable 
basis to find that Johnson committed violations of law while on probation because 
Johnson's federal convictions allege conduct which occurred prior to Johnson's 
sentencing and imposition of probation in district court. 
Respectfully submitted December 22, 2011. 
Tate W. Bennett, Esq. 
Millard County Public Defender 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT w 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
nmum ~h RH 3- Zb 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge James Brady 
Defendant, Jamis Johnson's Motion To Stay Sentence Pending Appeal, 
("Motion to Stay") and Application For Certificate of Probable Cause, 
("Application") came before the Court at a regularly scheduled and duly noticed 
hearing at 9:00 a.m., October 13, 2010. Defendant Johnson was present, and 
also Tate Bennett, who, upon affidavit of indigence, was duly appointed Mr. 
Johnson's public defender for the purpose of handling the appeal in this matter. 
No representative from the State was present and no responsive pleadings were 
on file from the State. The Court continued the hearing until the afternoon so that 
counsel for the State could be contacted. The matter was reconsidered at 3:00 
p.m. Present were Mr. Johnson and counsel Tate Bennett. The Court Clerk 
reported that since the morning continuance, she had contacted Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Baer and that he stated that he did not receive notice of 
the hearing and would not be available in person or telephonically for argument 
on this matter this day nor for the next ensuing two weeks. The Court Clerk 
affirmed that notice of this hearing was duly sent to Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Baer and to Defendant Johnson on October 4, 2010. The Court had read 
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the pleadings of Defendant and had reviewed the file and record in this matter. It 
was determined that Defendant Johnson had mailed copies of all pleadings to 
Assistant Attorney General Baer on September 7, 2010 but that the form of the 
Certificate of Probable Cause did not bear a signed mailing certificate and, the 
Court thus sent all parties a notice of an ex parte communication as to the form 
of Certificate of Probable Cause. A copy of the Certificate of Probable Cause 
was then further mailed by Defendant Johnson to Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Baer on September 21, 2010 and all pleadings hand delivered on October 
22, 2010 per letter in the record of Defendant. The record reflects that the Court 
Clerk duly sent notice of the hearing to Assistant Attorney General Mark Baer. 
The State has not filed any response to Defendant's Motion To Stay or to the 
Application, and has not appeared in the matter, and, although reached by the 
Court Clerk, Assistant Attorney General Baer declined to appear in person or 
telephonically or have other Assistant Attorneys General appear in behalf of the 
State. 
The Court duly and fully reviewed Defendant Johnson's Motion to Stay 
Sentence Pending Appeal, and the Application For A Probable Cause Certificate, 
and all related pleadings, and the same were also reviewed by Defendant's 
Public Defender Tate Bennett, who was appointed as appellate counsel for the 
purposes of the Appeal. Defendant Johnson represented himself for argument 
on the pending Motion To Stay and the Application before the Court. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having ascertained that the 
State had due notice and has not filed a responsive pleading, and the time for 
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response having passed, and the State declined to appear, and there appearing 
good cause in support of the motion and the application of Defendant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Stay of Sentence 
Pending Appeal is granted as follows: 
1. The sentence entered August 30,2010 revoking the probation of 
Defendant Johnson and reinstating it for a further 36 months is hereby 
euspentred pending the appeal of this sentence; and 
2. Defendant Johnson is released from incarceration in the Millard County 
Jail with credit for time served. 
DATED this O day of October, 2010. 
-,f IN Ra 
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Jamis M. Johnson 
c/o Millard County Jail 
765So.Hwy99 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
Tel. 801-530-0100 
Defendant Pro Se 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
JAMS M. JOHNSON 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND ORDER OF RELEASE 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge James Brady 
Defendant Jamis Johnson's Notice of Appeal and Application for Certificate of Probable 
Cause came regularly before the Court, the Honorable James Brady, Fourth District Court Judge 
presiding. The Court after having reviewed the pleadings on file and for good cause appearing 
now finds and certifies as follows: 
1. The appeal is not being taken for the purpose of delay. 
2. The appeal raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal, 
an order for a new trial or a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in jail or 
prison. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED: 
The Court determines defendant is not a flight risk and that the defendant does not pose a 
danger to any other person or the community and is released pending appeal upon the following 
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least restrictive conditions that the court has determined will reasonably assure the appearance of 
the person as required and the safety of persons and property in the community: 
a not commit a federal, state or local crime during the period of release; 
b. abide by specified restrictions on personal associations with any other person engaged in 
any criminal activity, remain residing at his usual place of abode, and engage in no travel 
outside the State without further order of the Court; 
c. avoid all conduct with the victim or victims of the crime(s), any witness who might 
testify concerning the offenses if the appeal results in a reversal or an order for a new 
trial; 
d. continues to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of each month; 
e. refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon; 
£ except as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner, refrain from possessing or using 
any narcotic drug or other controlled substance. 
DATED this ^> day of V U ^ ^ J ^ ^ , 2010 
f \N RED /; 
COURT: 
' ^ ~
 0/ST COU*Wi 
BLE JAMES 
istrict Court Judg£ 
I hereby certify that on 
Certificate of Probable Cause to Mark W. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
TMflFICATE OF SERVICE 
I . 2010 Tjrariled/a true and correct^  
t Attorney Ger 
& foregoing 
300 East, 
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
MILLARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I vs. 
JAMIS J . JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 051700056 
Date: June 17, 2011 
Judge: James Brady 
Having reviewed Defendants pro se expedited motion to amend and extend jail 
term 30 days to allow for stay and probable cause process, and Plaintiffs response 
thereto, the court reviewed the records and recordings of the May 17, 2011 hearing. 
Based on that review the court enters the following findings: 
The May 17, 2001 hearing was to consider allegation of probation violations by 
Defendant as a result of criminal convictions in a separate federal case. It was also to 
determine appropriate sanctions for findings of probation violations determined on April 
21, 2011 as well as sanctions, if any arising out of the alleged violations based on the 
federal convictions. 
With regards to only the violations related to the federal violations, after review 
the court now makes the following findings: 
1. The court made a clear and unambiguous determination that Defendant could not 
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be found in violation of probation for actions he took prior to being placed on 
probation. 
2. Although two of the counts in the Federal trial were alleged to have occurred on 
dates following Defendant being placed on probation by this court, upon 
further argument and examination of the document, at the May 7, 2001 
hearing, the court concluded that counts 10 and 22 of the federal indictment 
were dismissed by the United States Attorney, and did not result in a 
conviction. This court ruled that these two counts would not be considered a 
violation of Defendants probation. 
3. This court explicitly ruled that it would not consider as evidence of a violation of 
probation, any convictions in the federal case for actions taken before the 
date of sentencing in this case. 
4. On May 17, 2011 , when considering the States allegations of convictions on 
counts 18,19, 21, 23, 27, 28 and others, contained in the federal Indictment, 
this court came to the conclusion that Defendant was engaged in wrong 
doings including conspiracy and aiding and abetting others to commit mail 
fraud and wire fraud after being placed on probation. This conclusion was 
made in error. Upon review it is clear that the dates of these offenses predate 
Defendants sentencing in the present case. 
5. At the time of determining an appropriate sanction for defendants violation of his 
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probation, this court considered defendants perceived continuing criminal 
activities a significant violation, sufficient to justify the revocation of probation, 
and the imposition of the statutory sentence. 
6. In that the court erred in believing that defendants criminal conduct continued 
after being placed on probation, it is appropriate for the court to review and 
correct the sanction it issued at the hearing on May 17, 2011. 
7, The evidence at the hearing was clear and convincing that defendant violated 
probation when he failed to report to his probation officer. 
a. Defendant does not dispute that he failed to report to his probation officer, 
despite knowledge that the probation officer attempted to contact him 
several times. Defendant claims he was relieved from his obligations to 
contact his probation officer either because of an implication contained in 
an order of this court, or because his probation period had lapsed. 
b. This court did not order the termination of Defendants probation, nor his 
obligation to report to his probation officer. 
c. Although Defendant claims his obligation was changed from reporting to 
his probation officer to an obligation to report to the court on a monthly 
basis, this interpretation is only partially correct, The order did not 
terminate Defendants probation, but did order him to report monthly to the 
court. 
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d. As to his argument that reporting to the court supplanted his obligations to 
the probation officer, it did not. It should also be noted that even if it did 
Defendant also did not report to the court. 
e, As previously determined by this court, Defendants probation period did 
not lapse before the order to show cause was issued in October 2011 for 
Defendants various probation violations. 
8. This court previously found that Defendant violated his probation by failing to 
inform the probation department of his then current residence, or by changing 
his residence without notification to his probation officer, and for his failure to 
report to his probation officer on October 21, 2011. 
9. Previously Defendant had been found in violation of his probation agreement and 
was sentenced to 60 days in jail. That matter fs on appeal at this time. 
10. Based on the courts review of its findings and the order issued May 17, 2011, the 
court finds it is appropriate to amend its order. 
11. Defendants probation is revoked and reinstated for 36 months, Defendant is 
ordered to serve 120 days in the Millard County jail. Defendant shall come 
before the court for review before his release from jail, 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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i t / L Dated this i l day of June, 2011. 
#0" '<*%' 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES BRADY rK 
DISTRICT C O U R T J U D G E * - ' 
STAMP USED AT DISCRETION OF J U D G E 
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